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9		THE DISTRICT COLUMN	
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
11	STEVE TRUNK) Case No.: 06-CV-1597-LAB (WMc)	
12	Plaintiff,) (consolidated with 06-CV-1728)	
13	VS.		
14	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	BRIEF OF AMICI UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES RANDY	
15	et al.,) FORBES, DUNCAN HUNTER,	
16	Defendants,) ROBERT ADERHOLT, MICHAEL) CONAWAY, JEFF DUNCAN,	
17) STEPHEN FINCHER, SCOTT	
18	JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE	GARRETT, LOUIE GOHMERT, VICKY HARTZLER, BILL JOHNSON,	
19	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.,) WALTER JONES, MIKE KELLY, JAMES LANKFORD, ROBERT	
20	et al.,) LATTA, BILLY LONG, JEFF MILLER,	
21	Plaintiffs, vs.) MATT SALMON, AND LYNN) WESTMORELAND CONCERNING	
) THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY	
22	CHARLES TIMOTHY HAGEL, Secretary of Defense, in his)	
23	official capacity, Defendant.		
24	Dejenuum.)	
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Amici, United States Representatives Randy Forbes, Duncan Hunter, Robert Aderholt, Michael Conaway, Jeff Duncan, Stephen Fincher, Scott Garrett, Louie Gohmert, Vicky Hartzler, Bill Johnson, Walter Jones, Mike Kelly, James Lankford, Robert Latta, Billy Long, Jeff Miller, Matt Salmon, and Lynn Westmoreland, are currently serving members of the 113th Congress. They submit this brief pursuant to the Court's Minute Order of April 25, 2013.

Amici strongly disagree with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that the federal government's operation of the Mount Soledad Veterans Memorial violates the Establishment Clause due to the presence of its commemorative cross. At this juncture, however, Amici believe that the best course of action, in keeping with the goal of maintaining the Memorial as a longstanding tribute to our men and women in uniform, is to allow a private organization to continue to maintain the property as a veterans' memorial, via a sale or land transfer. Plaintiffs' assertion that "[t]he only remedy in this case that would be consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion is to order the removal of the Cross from its current position at the center of the Memorial atop Mount Soledad," Doc. 341, at 5, is incorrect.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Salazar v. Buono*, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010)—which Plaintiffs do not address—strongly supports the validity of a land transfer or sale of a public veterans memorial as a means of addressing Establishment Clause concerns raised in controlling judicial decisions, while avoiding the unwanted specter of the government destroying or removing aspects of the memorial. In *Salazar*, the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that held that a statute authorizing a land exchange between the federal government and the VFW was unconstitutional. *Id.* at 1811 (Kennedy, J., plurality). The statute—enacted in light of previous decisions holding that the government's operation of a World War I memorial unconstitutionally endorsed religion due to the memorial's cross—provided that the government

would transfer the memorial to the VFW on the condition that it continue to be maintained as a World War I memorial, in exchange for another parcel of land.

Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion stated that the lower court decisions regarding the land transfer had improperly attributed a sectarian religious motive to Congress. The lower courts' analysis ignored that the injunction resulting from the decision on the merits "presented the Government with a dilemma. It could not maintain the cross without violating the injunction, but it could not remove the cross without conveying disrespect for those the cross was seen as honoring." *Id.* at 1817. The opinion characterized the land transfer as a commonsense way to address this dilemma, and noted that, in the context of a veterans memorial, "a Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and its people." *Id.* at 1820.

Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion in which he emphasized the historical significance of crosses at veterans' memorials and the secular justification for the land transfer. *Id.* at 1821-24 (Alito, J., concurring). He explained,

If Congress had done nothing, the Government would have been required to take down the cross, which had stood on Sunrise Rock for nearly 70 years, and this removal would have been viewed by many as a sign of disrespect for the brave soldiers whom the cross was meant to honor. The demolition of this venerable if unsophisticated, monument would also have been interpreted by some as an arresting symbol of a Government that is not neutral but hostile on matters of religion and is bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of our country's religious heritage.

Id. at 1822-23 (citation omitted).

Other courts have upheld the sale or transfer of public property as a valid remedy in similar situations. For example, in *Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles*, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit upheld the sale of a portion of a city park that included a Ten

Commandments monument to the organization that donated the monument to the city. *Id.* at 705-06. The court explained:

The City . . . had a rather obvious secular motive for the sale--it wanted to eliminate its ownership in the Monument to preempt litigation accusing it of using the Monument to endorse a religious message by displaying it on public property. The Appellees claim that the reason is not secular because the City could have avoided the lawsuit by simply removing or allowing someone else to remove the Monument. They claim that by not removing it and by leaving it on what had been City property demonstrates that the City's motive was not secular. . . . [I]n most cases, a government can remedy a potential Establishment Clause violation by selling the real property where the religious monument sits. While removal was an option, so also was the sale. By selling the Monument site to end a perceived endorsement, the City exercised an option that served a secular purpose. . . .

A reasonable person, considering the history of the monument recited above, would understand the City's desire to keep the Monument in its original location.

In addition to meeting the legal standards of the Establishment Clause, the sale achieves a practical goal. The City is able to extricate itself completely from the implied endorsement of the purpose and content of the religious symbol, yet the Monument can remain in the location it has occupied for many years. If the local citizens at some point want the symbol moved to make way for an alternate use, the solution can be found in the political rather than the legal process.

Id. at 705; see also Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a city's sale of parkland that included a statue of Jesus did not violate the Establishment Clause, and remanding for further proceedings to remedy the inability to distinguish between the property at issue and nearby public property); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572-73 (D. Md. 2005) (upholding the sale of part of a public memorial ground that included a Ten Commandments monument to the monument's donor).

¹ Decisions that invalidated proposed sales of the Mount Soledad Veterans Memorial in the prior federal litigation involving the City of San Diego are not controlling because they were based on the California Constitution, not the federal Establishment Clause. *See Paulson v. City of San Diego*, 294 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (decision based upon Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 5); *Murphy v. Bilbray*, No. 90-134 GT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23707 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1997) (unpublished) (decision based upon Cal. Const. art. I, § 4 and art. XVI, § 5).

A sale or transfer of the Memorial to a private organization would remedy any perceived governmental endorsement of religion, like the land transfer in *Salazar* and the sale in *Mercier*. The terms of the acquisition would not dictate what particular items that the organization must keep, add, or remove from the Memorial as it presently stands, but rather would reflect the secular purpose of maintaining a veterans' memorial on the property. The Mount Soledad Memorial Association, which has worked tirelessly to improve and preserve the Memorial for many years, should be given the first opportunity to acquire and maintain the Memorial. Plaintiffs' failure to discuss *Salazar*, *Mercier*, or any similar cases while asserting that removal of the Memorial's cross is the only viable remedy is telling, and their proposed remedy would convey disrespect for those (of all faiths or none) that the Memorial's cross honors. *See Buono*, 130 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., plurality); *id.* at 1822-23 (Alito, J., concurring).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully request that the Court enter an order requiring Defendants to solicit and review offers for the sale or exchange of the Memorial, which would allow a private organization to continue to maintain the property as a veterans' memorial.

1	Dated: August 21, 2013	Respectfully submitted,
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